Rescission Under the Truth-in-Lending Act: Protecting Debtor and Creditor Alike by Sasamoto, Nancy E.
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 20
January 1980
Rescission Under the Truth-in-Lending Act:
Protecting Debtor and Creditor Alike
Nancy E. Sasamoto
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more
information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nancy E. Sasamoto, Rescission Under the Truth-in-Lending Act: Protecting Debtor and Creditor Alike, 20 Urb. L. Ann. 169 (1980)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol20/iss1/6
RECISSION UNDER THE TRUTH-IN-
LENDING ACT: PROTECTING DEBTOR
AND CREDITOR ALIKE
NANCYE. SASAMOTO*
During the post-World War II economic resurgence in America,
consumer credit became readily available.' The increased volume of
credit transactions overwhelmed many consumers with financing
terms, some of which were confusing2 and usurious.' In 1968, Con-
* B.S., University of Illinois, 1977; J.D., Washington University, 1980.
1. From 1950 to 1971, outstanding consumer credit rose from $21.5 to $137.2 bil-
lion. The National Commission on Consumer Finance report attributed the in-
creased use of consumer credit to "the natural adaption of consumer and business to
changes in the ability and willingness of consumers to incur debt, as well as to a
continued shift towards the ownership of assets." NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CON-
SUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as CONSUMER CREDIT].
Greater urbanization of the population also led to increased dependence on credit.
In 1950, over 15% of the population was rural, whereas the percentage dropped to less
than 5% by 1970. Also, young married consumers tend to be heavy credit consumers
and from 1950 to 1971 the number of people in the 18-to-24 age group grew from 18.6
milion to 28.2 million. This more than 50% increase exceeded the 33% increase in all
other age brackets.
The shift to asset ownership is evidenced by the increase in home ownership. The
commission notes that credit used to acquire homes is not statistically considered as
consumer credit, but adds that home ownership is accompanied by purchase of nu-
merous durable goods, such as washing machines, refrigerators and lawn-mowers.
id at 6.
2. Before the Act's passage, creditors used a variety of methods for computing
finance charges. Some creditors employed a monthly rate; others based the charge on
the original amount rather than on the declining balance. Creditors often informed
debtors of the dollar amount without reference to the rate, and sometimes included
incidental charges without explanation. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1962, 1970.
3. The concept of usury is of Biblical origin and encompassed any payment for
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gress responded to the consumers' plight4 by enacting the Truth-in-
Lending Act5 (TILA) to promote the informed use of credit6 through
the use of money. A modem definition of usury refers to "charging a rate of interest,
service charge or other charge upon the loan or forebearance of any money, goods,
services or things in action in excess of the rate permitted by the Constitution, statute
or regulation governing the transaction." PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, USURY LAWS
AND MODERN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 22 (1979).
Current state statutes set guidelines for permissible interest rates charged for the
use of money. The legal interest rate, established by statute, applies to the principal if
no interest rate was previously agreed upon. The contract rate, generally higher than
the legal rate, determines the highest rate parties may agree upon. For a chart of state
interest and usury rates, see 1 CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER, A COMPILATION OF FED-
ERAL AND STATE LAWS REGULATING CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES 118-36
(1977).
State legislatures, however, usually pass several exceptions to the general usury
rate. For example, a much higher rate of interest is allowed for small loans. In Mis-
souri, the general usury rate is 9% per annum, Mo. STAT. ANN. § 408.020 (Vernon
Supp. 1980), but 2.218% per month is allowed for small loans. Id. § 408.100. For
general discussions, see CONSUMER CREDIT, supra note 1, at 94-95; B. CLARK & J.
FONSECA, HANDLING CONSUMER CREDIT CASES 4 (1972) [hereinafter cited as CLARK
& FONSECA].
Interest rates are not always easy to calculate and various charges incident to a
transaction may constitute "interest" for purposes of the usury laws. See, e.g., Thrift
Funds of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Jones, 274 So. 2d 150 (La. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
820 (1973) (held that late charge may be interest for usury purposes). However, if
parties acted in good faith without intent to violate usury laws, the general rule is that
late charges are allowable. See also Hayes v. First Nat'l Bank of Memphis, 256 Ark.
328, 507 S.W.2d 701 (1974); H.D.S. Trading Co. v. Redisch, 19 Misc. 2d 716, 186
N.Y.S.2d 696 (Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 1959); Lew v. Goodfellow Chrysler-Plymouth, 6
Wash. App. 226, 492 P.2d 258 (1971); notes 19-20 and accompanying text ifra.
4. Consider, for example, the case of an electrical worker who paid $175 in 11
months on a $123.88 television set and still owed $182. N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1963, at
25, col. 5, as quoted in Note, Truth in Lending Act: The Impossible Dream, 22 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 89, 90 n.6 (1970).
According to the National Better Business Bureau, before TILA, home improve-
ment frauds cost consumers $500 million to $1 billion annually. Hearings on SJ. Res.
130, S. 3065 and S. 3066 Before the Senate Commerce Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess, at
75 (1968).
5. The Truth-in-Lending Act is Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act
(CCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1976). Congress originally designed the Act as a
disclosure measure. Subsequent amendments, however, have developed the Act's
regulatory features. For example, the 1974 Fair Credit Billing amendments, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666j (1976), impose several requirements on creditors that are unre-
lated to disclosure. A credit card issuer cannot prohibit a merchant who honors the
card from offering a discount for cash payment. See generally Schober, The Develop-
ment of the Truth in LendingAct in Congress andthe Courts, 3 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
457 (1979). There are currently nine titles in the CCPA. Title II deals with extortion-
ate extensions of credit. Title III covers garnishment. Title IV established the Na-
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meaningful disclosure of credit terms.7 To enforce this consumer
protection legislation, Congress employed mechanisms such as ad-
ministrative regulation,' civil liability9 and criminal sanctions.1 0
Congress also empowered the Federal Reserve Board" to promul-
gate regulations' 2 to effectuate the purposes of the Act.
tional Commission on Consumer Finance. Title V contains general provisions and
effective dates for the other four titles. The Fair Credit Reporting Act composes Title
VI. Title VII, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, became effective on Oct. 28, 1975.
Title VIII, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, was enacted on Sept. 20, 1977. The
final title, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, was enacted Nov. 10, 1978.
6. The Act defines "credit" as "the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer
payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment." 15 U.S.C. § 1602(e) (1976).
The extension of credit is available to any natural person for personal, family, house-
hold or agricultural purposes, Id § 1602(h). See Adema v. Great Northern Dev.
Co., 374 F. Supp. 318 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (buyer of recreational property for investment
is not a consumer within the meaning of the Act).
Congress exempted certain transactions in § 1603, including: credit transactions for
business purposes or those to government instrumentalities; loans, other than real
property transactions, exceeding $25,000; transactions in securities or commodities by
a registered broker-dealer; and transactions under public utility tariffs.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976).
8. Enforcing agencies are listed in id. § 1607(a) & (c), which designate the Federal
Trade Commission as the residual enforcing agent. In 1974, Congress amended the
Act, deleting the Interstate Commerce Commission and adding the Farm Credit Ad-
ministration to its scheme. Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 403, 88 Stat.
1517.
9. Section 1640(a) provides in pertinent part:
[A]ny creditor who fails to comply with any requirement. . . with respect to any
person is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum of-
(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of the failure;
(2)(A) in the case of an individual action twice the amount of any finance
charge in connection with the transaction,. . . except that the liability under this
paragraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater than $1,000.
10. Criminal sanctions for a creditor's wilful and knowing nondisclosure of re-
quired information or provision of false information include a fine of not more than
$5,000, or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. Id. § 1611.
11. Id. § 1604. The Supreme Court upheld the Board's authority in Mourning v.
Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1972). See also Strompolos v. Premium
Readers Serv., Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
12. The Board regulations pertaining to Truth in Lending are known as Regula-
tion Z, codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.15 (1980). There are some discrepancies be-
tween the Act and Regulation Z provisions. The Act requires creditors to disclose
clearly and conspicuously, 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (1976), while the Regulation further pro-
vides for clear and conspicuous disclosure "in meaningful sequence." 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.6(a) (1980). In assessing the meaningful sequence requirement, the 7th Circuit
1980]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
The Truth-in-Lending provisions include a right to rescind1 3 a
consumer credit transaction that is secured by an interest' 4 in the
debtor's residence. The consumer's right of rescission in these trans-
actions differs from common law rescission.' 5 Initial judicial inter-
pretations of the rescission section resulted in "consumer victories."' 6
However, a line of subsequent decisions' 7 modified the impact of the
Truth-in-Lending legislation as amended in 197418 and produced
several pro-creditor decisions. District courts faced with the task of
applying the Act's section 1640 civil remedies in light of the rescission
section rendered conflicting opinions as to the sections' interrelation-
ship.
Exercise of judicial discretion in awarding relief for Truth-in-
applied a "logical relation" test rather than an "arithmetical relation" test. Allen v.
Beneficial Fin. Co., 531 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 885 (1976).
The Board also issues two types of opinion letters: Official Staff Interpretations and
Unofficial Staff Letters. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(d)(4) (1980). As of mid-1978, the Act had
produced 60 Official Board Interpretations, 59 Official Staff Interpretations, over
1,200 published staff opinion letters and more than 9j000 TIL lawsuits filed in federal
courts. Brandl, An Overview and Introduction to the Annual Survey of Consumer Law
Development, 34 Bus. LAW. 1401 (1979).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1976).
14. The right of rescission "does not apply to the creation or retention of a first
lien against a dwelling to finance the acquisition of that dwelling." Id § 1635(e).
15. See notes 48-53 and accompanying text infra.
16. See Paer, Truth-in-Lending: Protectionfor the Consumer orfor the Creditor?,
24 EMORY L.J. 357 (1975). Among the early "consumer victories" Paer discusses are
Grubb v. Oliver Enterprises, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 970 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (first Truth-in-
Lending judgment to award significant attorney's fees); Buford v. American Fin. Co.,
333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (failure to disclose $1 notary fee violated Act);
Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(actual imposition of finance charge is irrelevant for civil liability).
17. "In the early part of 1974 the pendulum began to swing in favor of the credi-
tor. The Federal Reserve Board, as well as a number of courts, apparently began to
feel they had gone far enough and perhaps too far in protecting the consumer: they
decided to retreat." Paer, supra note 16, at 364-65.
18. Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 406-408(d), 88 Stat. 1518 (1974). Proposed legislation
to reform the Truth-in-Lending Law has received recent Congressional attention. On
May 1, 1979, the Senate passed Senator Proxmire's bill, S. 108. The purpose of S. 108,
entitled the Truth-in-Lending Simplification and Reform Act, is "to facilitate compli-
ance by simplifying the requirements imposed under that Act, [and] to facilitate ad-
ministrative enforcement." S. 108, 96th Cong. Ist Sess. (1979).
The House passed a similar bill, H.R. 4986. As of May 1, 1980, however, Congress
had taken no further action to reform the Truth-in-Lending laws. For a discussion of
S. 108's effect on current legislation, see CONSUMER CREDIT 1980 (PLI), Commercial
Law & Practice.
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Lending disclosure violations transforms litigation into a guessing
game for creditors and debtors. This note will describe TILA's
debtor remedies, examine the judicial approaches to these sections
and evaluate the concurrent availability of rescission and civil liabil-
ity. This analysis of the courts' current rationales may aid the attor-
ney in assessing his debtor-client's position in seeking relief under
Truth-in-Lending. After an overview, this note recommends incor-
poration of the debtor's obligation into the judgment as consistent
with the Congressional intent of protecting consumers without ineq-
uitably penalizing creditors.
I. BACKGROUND
Prior to Truth-in-Lending, consumer credit protection consisted
primarily of small loan legislation' 9 and usury laws.z° The former set
standards for those licensed in the small loan industry; usury laws
limited the amount of interest allowed for the use of money. The
scope of these measures, however, was narrow and did not encom-
pass credit sales of goods.2 The rationale was that merchants who
sold on credit were not lenders22 since cash paid over a period of time
was not worth as much as the total price at the time of purchase.
Under this theory, merchants, allowed to increase the price of the
goods to account for the difference between the time-purchase price
and the cash price, were not considered to be assessing an interest
charge.23 As consumer credit purchases increased, states responded
19. All states except Arkansas have enacted small loan laws to protect prospective
borrowers from loan-sharking. Under these acts, a state agency is authorized to li-
cense lenders and supervise their activities. B. CURRAN, TRtfNDS IN CONSUMER
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS 16 (1965) [hereinafter cited as CURRMA]. See generally R.
NUGENT & L. ROBINSON, REGULATION OF THE SMALL LOAN BUSINESS (1935).
20. See generally CURRAN, supra note 19, at 15.
21. See Note, supra note 4, at 95.
22. The Supreme Court in Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115, 118-19 (1861),
stated:
But it is manifest that if A propose to sell to B a tract of land for $10,000 in cash,
or for $20,000 payable in ten annual instalments, and if B prefers to pay the
larger sum to gain time, the contract cannot be called usurious. A vendor may
prefer $100 in hand to double the sum in expectancy, and a purchaser may prefer
the greater price with the longer credit. . . . Such a contract has none of the
characteristics of usury; it is not for the loan of money, or forbearance of a debt.
23. CURRAN, supra note 19, at 13. See also Note, supra note 4, at 95.
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with retail installment sales acts.24 These acts included disclosure
provisions similar to truth-in-lending requirements. The Truth-in-
Lending Act was a federal attempt to integrate the various earlier
legislative acts and cover all consumer credit transactions.
A. Legislative History
Both houses of Congress introduced consumer protection bills in
early 196025 with a stated purpose of assuring a "meaningful disclo-
sure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare
more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the
uninformed use of credit.",26 The Act, passed several years after these
24. See generally Hogan,, ASurvey of State Retail Instalment Sales Legislation, 44
CORNELL L.Q. 38 (1958).
25. Senator Paul Douglas (D. I11.) introduced the "Consumer Credit Labeling"
bill on January 7, 1960. S. 2755, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 106 CONG. REC. 95, 97 (1960).
"The purpose of the bill is to require lenders and vendors to tell the truth about
interest rates and finance charges" and thus achieve economic stabilization. d. at 97.
The bill required disclosure of the total amount of finance charges and the percentage
that amount bears to the outstanding balance in terms of simple annual interest. Id
(remarks of Senator Douglas). However, the bill was never voted out of the subcom-
mittee. See, Schober, supra note 5, at 457-58 (1979).
On April 27, 1961, Senator Douglas introduced another bill, entitled the Truth in
Lending Act. This second attempt was more expansive in scope. Schober, stqira, at
459. S. 1740, 87th Cong., Ist Sess., 107 CONG. REC. 6778 (1961). Section 4 of this bill
required the following disclosures:
(1) the cash price or delivered price of the property or service to be acquired;
(2) the amounts, if any, to be credited as down payment and/or trade-in;
(3) the difference between the amounts set forth under clauses (1) and (2);
(4) the charges, individually itemized, which are paid or to be paid by such
person in connection with the transaction but which are not incident to the exten-
sion of credit;
(5) the total amount to be financed;
(6) the finance charge expressed in terms of dollars and cents; and
(7) the percentage that the finance charge bears to the total amount to be
financed expressed as a simple annual rate on the outstanding unpaid balance of
the obligation.
Id at 6853 (remarks of Sen. Douglas). After extensive hearings, this bill also failed to
clear the subcommittee.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976). The Truth-in-Lending Act's disclosure requirement
serves a descriptive function and a shopping function, thus allowing a consumer to
choose in a credit transaction between any available source and his own resources.
See Comment, Private Remedies Under the Truth-in-Lendng Act: The Relationship
Between Rescission and Civil Liability, 57 IowA L. REV. 199 (1971). For a discussion
of the Act's functions and the effectiveness of the disclosure requirement, see CON-
SUMER CREDIT, supra note 1, at 171-91. In this 1972 report, the National Commission
on Consumer Finance concluded that the Act had been less effective in effecting the
[Vol. 20:169
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initial attempts, regulates open-end credit where the consumer re-
ceives credit or goods on credit and the cost of credit is based on the
outstanding unpaid balance as computed at periodic intervals.27 This
provision encompasses revolving charge accounts and institutional
credit card and check credit plans. In these open-end situations, the
creditor must furnish disclosures before the first transactions.
Other forms of consumer transactions, such as retail installment
sales and installment loans, utilize closed-end credit.2" These involve
the extension of a fixed amount of credit determined at the transac-
tion's outset and repayable in a specified number of installments at a
predesignated amount. The Act requires closed-end credit disclo-
sures to precede the transaction's consummation.29
The Act in its final form resulted from much compromise.' ° Origi-
nally, neither the Senate nor the House bill mentioned rescission.
The Senate bill, however, did provide a civil remedy.31 During de-
descriptive and economic stabilization functions than it had in effecting the shopping
function. Id at 191.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(i) (1976); 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(x) (1980).
28. Closed-end credit is also known as "other than open-end" credit. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1638 (1976). This note focuses on closed-end transactions. A creditor must disclose
finance charges as defined under Regulation Z. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4 (1980). Disclosure
must also inform the consumer of the date on which the finance charge begins to
accrue. Id § 226.8(b)(1). Compliance with TILA also requires disclosure of the an-
nual percentage rate, id § 226.8(b)(2); repayment schedule and total, id. § 226.8(b)(3);
default and late charges, id § 226.8(b)(4), and any security interest, id. § 226.8(b)(5).
A recent survey of consumer law development noted that reported cases indicate com-
pliance with open-end disclosure requirements is less troublesome than compliance
with closed-end provisions. Miller, Truth in Lending4ct, 34 Bus. LAW. 1405 (1979).
29. For a discussion of open-end and closed-end credit, see Feldman, 4 Review of
the Provisions of Federal Statutes and Implementing Regulations in the Field of Con-
sumer Credit, 3 OKLA. CiTY U. L. REV. 477 (1979).
30. See Schober, supra note 5, who explains:
There was a little something for almost everyone. Retailers wanted open-end
credit excluded. It was not, but open-end creditors were given the right to make
the optional disclosure of the "average effective annual percentage rate of return"
on open-end accounts. The real estate industry wanted first mortgages exempted
completely. They were not, but the disclosure of the amount of the finance
charge was not required in first purchase money real property transactions. Pro-
ponents of states' rights wanted a broad exclusion for states with similar laws.
They did not get it, but the Federal Reserve Board was given authority to grant
exemptions to states with "substantially similar" laws where there was "adequate
provision for enforcement."
Id. at 459-60.
31. See S. 2755, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
The intent of the Senate was unequivocal. The Act was to be enforced solely by
1980)
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bate in the House, Representative Cahill sponsored an amendment 32
requiring disclosure in a three-day period prior to execution of the
contract. A conference committee 33 replaced without explanation 34
the three-day notice before execution provision with the present
three-day right of rescission. Congress thus adopted the Truth-in-
Lending Act in a form that reflects both Senate concern with civil
enforcement and House emphasis on administrative enforcement.
B. Statutory Provisions
1. Rescission: Subsection 1635(a)
The right of rescission under subsection 1635(a) applies to con-
sumer credit transactions35 where the creditor obtains a security in-
consumers through private suits for a civil penalty which would secure substan-
tial compliance with the Act. The House expressed itself with equal clarity; voic-
ing concern for the unsophisitcated consumer of modest means for whom
recourse to civil litigation or the Attorney General was unrealistic, it announced
that administrative enforcement would be fundamental to the purpose of the Act.
Note, Truth in Lending Act Litigation: Concurrent Recourse to Rescission and the Civil
Penalty, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 840, 842 (1975). See H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1967); S. REP. No. 392, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1967); 113 CONG.
REC. 18,401-02 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire); 113 CONG. REC. 18,412 (1967)
(remarks of Sen. Bennett). See also Hearings on H.R 11601 be/ore the Subcomm. on
Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 2, at 828 (1967). 114 CONG. REC. 14,486-87 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
32. H.R. 11601, § 203(e), 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
33. S. REP. No. 392, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
34. The House managers compelled a vote before debate during the passage of
the conference report, thus accounting for the lack of legislative history. 114 CONG.
REc. 14,486-93 (1968). There is some indication, however, that the inclusion of the
rescission provision stemmed from congressional concern regarding abuses in the
home-improvement and second-mortgage industry. 114 CONG. REC. 1611 (1968) (re-
marks of Rep. Cahill).
35. Consumer credit transactions usually consist of consumer loans and credit
sales. For a general discussion, see S. MORGANSTERN, LEGAL REGULATION OF CON-
SUMER CREDIT (1972). Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.3 (1980) governs the exempted
transactions.
Credit must be extended by a "creditor" as defined by 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(s) (1980).
A creditor is one who in the ordinary course of business extends or arranges the ex-
tension of consumer credit or offers to extend or arrange such credit, which is payable
in more than four installments. See Manning v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co.,
533 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 865, rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 933
(1976) (automobile dealer receiving a commission for referring a customer to a
financing agency is a creditor); James v. Ragin, 432 F. Supp. 887 (W.D. N.C. 1977)
(extension of credit ten times in five years in not "isolated and incidental extension of
credit"). There must be a finance charge connected with the transaction. For speci-
(Vol. 20:169
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terest36 on the debtor's primary residence.37 Section 226.9(b) of
Regulation Z requires the creditor 8 to provide the customer with no-
fled purposes, the term "creditor" refers to credit caid issuers and those persons who
"honor cards. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(s) (1980). See generally Case Note, Consumer Protec-
tion-Truth in Lending 4ct--"Creditor"--Demtion and Election of Remedies, 21
WAYNE L. REv. 977 (1975).
36. As defined by the regulations:
'Security interest' and 'security' mean any interest in property which secures
payment or performance of an obligation. The terms include, but are not limited
to, security interests under the Uniform Commercial Code, real property mort-
gages, deeds of trust, and other consensual or confessed liens whether or not
recorded, mechanic's, materialmen's, artisan's, and other similar liens, vendor's
liens in both real and personal property, the interest of a seller in a contract for
the sale of real property, any lien on property arising by operation of law, and
any interest in a lease when used to secure payment or performance of an obliga-
tion.
12 C.F.R. § 226.2(gg) (1980). See N.C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors, 473 F.2d
1210 (2d Cir. 1972) (meaningful disclosure must include the statutory liens and treat
them uniformly under the Act). But see Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 539
F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 929 (1977); Mims v. Dixie Fin. Corp.,
426 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (assignment and waiver of homestead does not
create a security interest).
Prior to the TILA's enactment, most creditors took a security interest in the form of
a cognovit note. The note's terms entitled the creditor to a judgment without notice to
the debtor and could award him a judgment lien on the debtor's principal residence.
Thus, such a credit transaction could result in the loss of the obligor's home. S. MOR-
GANSTERN, LEGAL REGULATION OF CONSUMER CREDIT 16-17 (1972).
Mechanic's and materialman's liens can come under the TILA's rescission provi-
sion in a single payment transaction, even though a finance charge is not conspicu-
ously imposed. "If a plumber or a materialman offers a discount for prompt
payment, he is imposing a finance charge under Regulation Z § 226.8(o), and the
transaction is subject to rescission even though he does not record his lien." Abra-
ham, Some Rescission Problems in Truth-in-Lending, 87 BANKING L.J. 867, 869
(1970).
One commentator considers the mechanic's lien "insidious because, unlike the con-
sensual lien. . . the mechanic's lien (in those states in which it arises by operation of
law) requires no affirmative act on the part of the customer and little or nothing on
the part of the creditor." Burstein, There's Truth in Lending, But is There Right in
Rescirsion? 2 REAL EST. REv. 83, 84 (1972).
37. Thus, if a consumer has more than one residence, the Act does not cover any
transactions involving liens on secondary abodes. For examples, the rescission provi-
sion is inapplicable where a vacation home is concerned. The staff members of the
Federal Reserve Board have expressed the opinion that transactions involving a va-
cant lot on which a debtor expects to build his primary residence are rescindable.
However, Burstein disagrees because the consumer does not need the protection of
the right of rescission since "the roof over his head" is not jeopardized. Burstein,
supra note 36, at 86.
38. See note 35 supra. The Act also provides for the involvement of more than
one creditor in a transaction. 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(d) (1980).
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tice3 9 of this right; the regulations even specify the typeface size re-
quired for such notice.4" If a creditor receives the customer's signed
acknowledgment of receipt of required disclosures, a rebuttable pre-
sumption of delivery arises.4 ' Creditors must delay performance un-
til satisfied that proper disclosure has been made and the customer
has chosen not to exercise his rescission right.42
The obligor has until midnight of the third business day43 after the
consummation of the transaction or following the delivery of all re-
quired disclosures4 in which to notify the creditor of his intention to
39. The creditor must furnish the customer with two copies of the notice of oppor-
tunity to rescind and the customer can use one copy to cancel the transaction. Id
§ 226.9(b) (1980). In a case involving multiple obligors, the court in Gerasta v. Hiber-
nia Nat'l Bank, 411 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. La. 1976), modifed, 575 F.2d 580 (5th Cir.
1978), held that the creditor was liable for disclosures to only one of two property
owners. Reg. Z § 226.6(e)'s allowance of disclosure only to the primary customer
does not apply to transactions that can be rescinded.
The requirement of notice of the rescission right relates to TILA's purpose of al-
lowing consumers to compare. See James v. Home Const. Co., 458 F. Supp. 54 (S.D.
Ala. 1978) (Act does not require extension to successor obligor, plaintiff, administra-
tor of his mother's estate, not allowed to rescind on home-improvement contract).
40. The print must be not less than 12-point bold-faced type. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(b)
(1980).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(c) (1976).
42. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c) (1980). Creditors may not:
1) Disburse any money other than in escrow;
2) Make any physical changes in the property of the customer;,
3) Perform any work or service for the customer, or
4) Make any deliveries to the residence of the customer if the creditor has re-
tained or will acquire a security interest other than one arising by operation of
law.
43. A business day is any calendar day except Sunday and the following legal
holidays: New Year's Day, Washington's Birthday, Memorial Day, Independence
Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day, Veteran's Day, Thanksgiving Day and Christmas
Day. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(a) n.14 (1980).
44. Essentially there are two identifiable three-day periods under the Act. The
first one is the three-day period following the transaction's consummation which
serves as a "cooling-ofi' period. This grants relief to consumers that have fallen prey
to high-pressure sales tactics. Boyd, The Federal Consumer Credit Protection 4ct-,4
Consumer Perspective, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 171, 188 (1970).
The second period in which a debtor may rescind arises from the creditor's failure
to disclose. This right to rescind may be seen as a continuing one if the disclosures
remain deficient. Ljepava v. M.L.S.C. Prop., Inc., 511 F.2d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 1975).
See also Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1974); Wachtel v. West, 476 F.2d
1062 (5th Cir. 1973). However, the regulations provide that the right to rescind ex-
pires either three years after the transaction's consummation, or on the date the cus-
tomer transfers away the property, whichever occurs first. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (1976);
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rescind.45 The obligor can only modify or waive the right to rescind
in two situations. These exceptions apply when credit is needed to
meet a "bona fide immediate personal emergency of the customer
46
or when a three-day delay "will jeopardize the welfare, health or
safety of natural persons or endangerproperty which the customer
owns or for which he is responsible. 47
2. Common Law Rescission and Subsection 1635(b)
Generally, a wrong gives rise to several coexisting remedial rights.
At common law, the injured party had to elect one remedy. Alterna-
tive remedies were deemed inconsistent.4 Thus, a party to a contract
had to choose between suing for damages or seeking rescission since
the former affirmed the contract and the latter avoided it.4 9 Theoreti-
cally, this election doctrine prevented a plaintiff's double recovery.
A party electing rescission ° must act consistently with the reme-
dial goal of placing parties in the positions they would have been in if
the contract had not been executed. Common law required that the
plaintiff notify the other party of his intention not to be bound by the
12 C.F.R. § 226.9(h) (1980). See Note, Truth-in-Lending: Judicial Modfication of the
Right ofRescission, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1227, 1233 n.31.
45. The rescinding consumer must notify the creditor by mail or telegram or other
writing expressing his intention to rescind. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(a) (1980). The debtor
need not state his reason for exercising his right of rescission. See Griffith, Truth-in-
Lending., Some Aspects, 26 DEPAUL L. REv. 566, 588 (1977).
46. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(e)(1) (1980). See Ljepava v. M.L.S.C. Prop., Inc., 511 F.2d
935, 944 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding waiver ineffective because no "bona fide emergency"
existed since lenders knew from title they had ordered that no foreclosure was immi-
nent). For a discussion of Ljepava, see Note, The Truth in Lending Act: A Summary
of Consumer's Remedies, 22 S.D. L. REv. 322, 334 (1977).
47. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(e)(2) (1980). The customer'must give the creditor a separate
dated and signed statement describing the situation that necessitates the modifying or
waiving of the rescission right. Id § 226.9(e)(3).
48. One policy argument is that election of remedies prevents vexatious litigation
and supports the view that a litigant should not hold inconsistent positions. See gener-
aly Dobbs, Pressing Problemsfor the Piainti9's Lawyer in Rescission: Election ofRem-
edies and Restoration of Consideration, 26 ARK. L. Rv. 322, 325 (1972).
49. Dobbs, supra note 48 at 328. See Eastbum v. Galyen, 313 S.W.2d 794 (Ark.
1958); Lee, Executrix v. Erickson, 226 Ark. 442, 291 S.W.2d 238 (1956).
50. The term "rescission" refers to both rescission at law and the equitable rem-
edy of cancellation. The scope of this note encompasses only the former. Plaintiffs
may, however, resort to equity courts for rescission. Dobbs, supra note 48, at 343.
Under the latter procedure, the plaintiff seeks a court's decree of equity, thus elimi-
nating the consumer's need to guess about his legal rights. Dobbs, supra, at 343.
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contract. The rescinding party also had to restore or offer to restore
whatever consideration he received pursuant to the bargained-for
agreement. 5 The tender of restoration is closely related to the elec-
tion issue, because the debtor's failure to return or attempt to return
the consideration may be perceived as a decision to retain the con-
tract.
52
By enacting the Truth-in-Lending Act, Congress modified com-
mon law rescission to afford consumers a private means of enforce-
ment.53 Under section 1635, once the borrower exercises his right to
rescind, he is no longer liable for any finance charges and any secur-
ity interest becomes void.54 Within ten days of notification, the credi-
tor must return any money or property and take any action necessary
"to reflect termination of any security interest created under the
transaction. '55 Only after the creditor's performance must the debtor
tender56 any consideration received or its reasonable value. Upon
the creditor's failure to take possession of the consideration, the prop-
erty vests in the customer without obligation to pay.57 The Act pro-
tects consumers by requiring creditors to initiate action and by
creating the possibility of a consumer windfall.
3. Civil Liability: Section 1640
Congress provided a second private enforcement mechanism for
consumers through section 1640's imposition of civil liability for
creditor nondisclosure of required information.58  The aggrieved
debtor is entitled to any "actual damages" 59 upon bringing an action
within one year of the violation.60 Many errors or nondisclosures,
51. S. WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTs § 1454, at 10 (3d ed. 1970).
52. Dobbs, supra note 48, at 325.
53. "The Truth in Lending Act provides the consumer with a new substantive
basis for voiding a credit agreement and reorders the sequence of rescission and
tender." Note, supra note 44, at 1231.
54. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(d) (1980).
55. Id.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1976).
57. Id
58. Id § 1640. S. 108, discussed in note 18 supra, would limit civil liability and
class action exposure to violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1635, 1637(a), (b)(4-10), and
1638(a)(2), (3), (4), (5), (6) or (9).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (1976).
60. Id § 1640(e).
Any action under this section may be brought in any United States district court,
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however, do not involve actual damages.6 For example, a creditor's
nondisclosure of a default charge62 does not cause the non-defaulting
debtor pecuniary harm. Additionally, actual damages present
problems of proof and calculation.63
Second, the nondisclosing creditor may also be liable for a penalty
of twice the transaction's finance charge. The minimum penalty in
such cases is one hundred dollars, the maximum one thousand dol-
lars. " As amended,65 section 1640 also provides for class action
damages, subject only to a maximum recovery.66 Awarding litigation
costs and reasonable attorney's fees also encourages consumer ac-
* 61tion.
or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date of
the occurrence of the violation.
ld.
61. S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973); Alop & Rosenberg, Remedies
Under the Truth-in-Lending Act. Selected Issues, 60 CHIc. B. REC. 40, 41 (1978).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(9) (1976).
63. The ease of calculating actual damages varies with the nature of the specific
violation involved. For example, if a change is understated rather than omitted, "it
would be fitting to hold that payments in excess of disclosed amounts are actual dam-
ages." Alop and Rosenberg, supra note 61, at 42.
Generally, the burden of proof is on the debtor asserting injury under the Act. See
Grandway Credit Corp. v. Brown, 295 So.2d 714 (Fla. 1974). The court in Burrell v.
City Dodge, Inc., 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,764 (N.D. Ga., June 21, 1974) set
the standard of proof of actual damages:
If a consumer is damaged as the result of a violation of the (Truth in Lending)
Act, his damages presumably would be measured by the difference between the
cost of alternative credit which he may have chosen had the terms of the credit
been fully disclosed and the cost of the credit extended.
Id at 1 88,391.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A) (1976). Plaintiff may bring an action under this
subsection without a showing of financial loss. Dzadovsky v. Lyons Ford Sales, Inc.,
593 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979).
65. Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 406-408(d), 88 Stat. 1518 (1974). The 1974 amendment
of § 1640 reflects Congressional awareness of judicial reluctance to certify class ac-
tions. See Fischer, From Ratner to Qui Tam: Truth-in-Lending Class Action Develop-
ments, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 813, 833-35 (1973).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (1976) ("the total recovery . . . shall not be more
than the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the creditors").
67. Id. § 1640(a)(3). Courts usually determine reasonable attorney's fees.
Thomas v. Myers-Dickson Furniture Co., 479 F.2d 740, 748 (5th Cir. 1973). See also
Hannon v. Security Nat'l Bank, 537 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1976) (unlicensed law school
graduate who represented himself not awarded attorney's fees); Manning v. Princeton
Consumer Discount Co., Inc., 533 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 865
(1976). The Hannon court held that the purpose of awarding attorney's fees was "to
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Although Congress drafted section 1640 to deter and punish viola-
tions, that provision also recognizes the possibility of harsh rdsults
and attempts to prevent inequities. Thus, a creditor can avoid section
1640 liability by notifying the concerned debtor of the error and mak-
ing any appropriate adjustments within fifteen days of discovery and
before institution of any action.68 The Act also prohibits recovery
based on unintentional bona fide errors.69 No liability is imposed for
good faith compliance with any rule, regulation, or Federal Reserve
Board interpretation.70 Anticipation of consumer windfalls also
prompted restricting recovery for multiple nondisclosures. Multiple
failures to disclose in a single credit transaction only give rise to a
single award.7 1
II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECTION 1635 AND SECTION 1640
Since the Truth-in-Lending Act's passage, the issue of whether or
not a consumer can bring an action for both rescission and civil dam-
ages has arisen frequently.72 A reading of the legislative history does
make a litigant whole and to facilitate private enforcement of the Truth in Lending
Act." 537 F.2d at 328.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(b) (1976). S. 108 § 8(b)(6) would amend the Act to require
disclosure within 60 days of discovery. See note 18 supra.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c) (1976). By a preponderance of evidence the creditor must
show that the violation was not intentional and resulted "notwithstanding the mainte-
nance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error." Id. The court in
Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1974), reasoned that
requiring consumers to prove creditors intentionally violated the Act would produce a
hollow remedy for consumers. Id at 1166. The court held that voluntary and delib-
erate acts and omissions were intentional. Id Contra, Welmaker v. W.T. Grant Co.,
365 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (credit provisions of department store's coupon-
book plan violate TILA, but court held defendants did not intend to violate and had
made good-faith errors, so liability would result in "manifest injustice"). See also
Comment, Truth-in-Lending--Standing--Statutory Recovery Available Despite Ab-
sence of Actual Injury Since Statute Dones Injury in Fact, 47 Miss. L.J. 560, 566
(1976) (unintentional violation defense could have curbed suits motivated by grudge
against creditor but it has generally been read out of the statute by the courts).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(t) (1976). For a discussion of the good-faith defense, see
Paer, Truth-in-Lending, supra note 16. "Restricting the good faith defense is ex-
tremely important to private enforcement for otherwise the plaintiff's attorney cannot
gauge the strength of his case prior to engaging in expensive discovery." Id at 367.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(g) (1976). However, continued failure to disclose after a re-
covery has been granted gives rise to rights to additional recoveries. Id
72. See generally Comment, supra note 26. "The Act does not indicate whether
rescission and civil liability are inconsistent and thus mutually exclusive remedies, or
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little to clarify the interrelationship of the two sections.7 3 Courts
must therefore interpret the Act's provisions according to their view
of its legislative purpose. Courts that regard the Truth-in-Lending
Act as remedial in nature consider the Congressional goal to be resto-
ration of the parties. Other decisions, however, stress that Congress
designed the penal provisions of the Act to ensure creditor compli-
ance.
7 4
A. Judicial Interpretations
The district court in Bostwick v. Cohen7 1 was the first to evaluate
the concurrent availability of rescission and civil damages. The Bost-
wick court held that the traditional election of remedies doctrine76
was applicable to the Act's provisions. As such, the plaintiff waived
her right to civil damages by exercising her right to rescind. 7 The
court relied on the principle that the common law should not be su-
perseded unless a statute clearly intends that result.78
The Bostwick court classified the civil liability section as remedial
rather than punitive. According to this rationale, once rescission is
granted, the debtor is afforded a remedy and the parties are restored
to their previous status. In addition, the court in Bostwick found that
the rescinding consumer is not within the class of persons which the
civil liability section is deemed to protect. The Act seeks to protect
the "aggrieved debtor," 9 and the Bostwick court held that a con-
essentially complimentary, and therefore, to be treated as conjunctive recourses." Id
at 203.
73. The mutual exclusivity of the sections is important only in certain circum-
stances. It is only an issue when a security interest is taken on the debtor's home and
there is a violation of the disclosure requirements. This violation is subject to a one-
year statute of limitations as provided in § 1640. See Note, supra note 31, at 843.
74. Note, supra note 31, at 859 (§ 1640 acts primarily as a penalty for enforce-
ment; compensation is a secondary function).
75. 319 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (plaintiff sought statutory damages for
defendants' alleged failure to make required disclosures in connection with a credit
agreement for installation of a swimming pool).
76. See notes 48-49 and accompanying text supra.
77. 319 F. Supp. at 877.
78. Id Generally in the absence of a clear intention, a statute should not super-
sede common law. 3 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 6201 at 164-65 (3d ed. 1943).
79. 319 F. Supp. at 878 n.1. See Case Note, supra note 35, at 986.
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sumer allowed to rescind does not suffer an injury since the creditor
can no longer impose a finance charge.
Most courts disagree with Bostwick and allow conjunctive relief in
certain situations. The Supreme Court in 1973 set forth a liberal in-
terpretation of the Act. In Mourning v. Family Publications Service,
Inc. ,s the consumer-client defaulted on a five-year magazine sub-
scription contract that provided inadequate credit information. The
Court stated that the Act demonstrated a legislative policy change
from caveat emptor to "[l]et the seller disclose.""' Congress sought to
achieve this change "[b]y erecting a barrier between the seller and the
prospective purchaser in the form of hard facts." 2
The Mourning court rejected the argument advanced in Bostwick
that lack of a finance charge prevented imposition of a civil penalty.
83
It did add, however, that the minimum sanction would be appropri-
ate in such cases.84 A New York district court partially followed this
reasoning in Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. 5 Ratner
80. 411 U.S. 356 (1973). Plaintiff, a 73-year-old widow, sought to recover statu-
tory penalty and costs for defendant's failure to reveal the total amount due, the un-
paid balance or the service and finance charges with respect to a five-year magazine
subscription. The signed contract stated that plaintiff could not cancel and provided
for acceleration of the entire balance due upon any default.
81. Id at 377.
82. Id
83. The court upheld the Board's use of the "more-than-four-installment" rule,
which extended the coverage of the Act to any transaction that was payable in more
than four installments. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k) (1972). The rule was to prevent creditors
from burying finance charges in seemingly cost-free arrangements. Even if such a
service is "free" to consumers, it is obviously costing the creditors something and this
would probably result in higher prices. See CONSUMER CREDIT, supra note 1, at 184-
85; Clontz, The Contract, in CONSUMER CREDIT 1976: THE ANATOMY OF THE
CREDIT TRANSACTION 99, 107 (1976).
84. 411 U.S. at 376.
85. 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. N.Y. 1971) (bank was held liable for failing to disclose
the nominal annual percentage rate in monthly billings to customers who had out-
standing balances, but who had incurred no finance charges). Rainer is most noted
for its holding on class action suits regarding Truth-in-Lending. The Ratner court
held that a suit for violation of Truth-in-Lending could not be maintained as a class
action. The court's rationale was that since the Act provided civil penalties under
§ 1640, each consumer could act as his own "private attorney general" and thus the
incentive of a class action remedy was not necessary. The court also foresaw the
potentially devastating effect on creditors of a recovery by a large group of class mem-
bers. See also Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1974)
(Congress must have realized class actions were part of the existing body of law prior
to Act's passage and did not expressly or impliedly exclude their use).
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held that incurring or paying a finance charge was irrelevant in deter-
mining section 1640 liability. That liability, the court said, was based
upon the creditor's failure to disclose as required by the Act.86 The
Ratner court agreed with Bostwick and deemed section 1640 reme-
dial, but in dictum went beyond Bostwick by characterizing section
1640 as a liquidated damages provision. 7
B. Analysis a/the Relationship Between Section 1635
and Section 1640
Characterizing the Act's overall function as penal rather than re-
medial supports the availability of conjunctive relief. The Bostwick
and Ratner view of section 1640 as a strictly remedial provision is
susceptible to much criticism. First, subsection 1640(a)(1) provides
for guaranteed minimum relief, while at the same time imposing a
limit on creditor liability. This is inconsistent with a remedial view of
the provision, since actual damages 88 would be the best measure of
liability for remedial purposes. One analysis of the Act has put this
another way: The lack of a relationship between the extent of liabil-
ity and the injury involved suggests that compensation is not a pri-
mary statutory purpose.89
Second, Congress provides a bona fide error defense in subsection
1640(2)(c), which excuses unintentional bona fide errors by credi-
tors." This also indicates the section's penal nature. The intent ele-
ment would be irrelevant if Congress intended a strictly
compensatory remedy. Courts recognizing these penal elements may
be more willing to award civil penalties in conjunction with remedial
measures.
In enforcing the Act, some courts also examine equitable factors9 1
and thus apply judicial discretion.92 In using this "discretionist ' 93
86. For a discussion of Ratner, see Note, supra note 31, at 848-49.
87. Id at 849.
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A) (1976). Congress added the language pertain-
ing to actual damages in the 1974 amendments. Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 406-408(d), 88
Stat. 1518 (1974). See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
89. Note, supra note 31, at 854.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c) (1976). See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
9 1. The Supreme Court stated that "it would not be construction but legislation to
restrict the meaning of the statute in accord with narrower legislation in other states,
because in the judgment of a court it might be equitable to do so." Holden v. Strat-
ton, 198 U.S. 202, 210 (1905).
92. The propriety of such discretion "of course will depend on the equities present
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approach to section 1635, a court may balance certain factors such as:
(1) whether the creditor asserted a good faith defense to the bor-
rower's act of rescission; (2) of what significance the creditor's
violation would be to a reasonable consumer, comparison-shop-
ping for credit; (3) whether the borrower indicated either will-
mgness or ability to repay the loan proceeds; and (4) whether
other means of enforcing creditor compliance are available.94
Avoiding a literal reading of section 1635, some courts condition
an award of rescission upon the debtor's tender of consideration. The
court in Palmer v. Wilson9" recognized that the Act abolished the
debtor's tender as a prerequisite to rescission, yet still upheld the
court's equitable powers to require tender. The Palmer holding re-
flects judicial fear that a literal application of TILA will too harshly
and inequitably penalize creditors.96 Congressional failure in the
1974 amendments to contradict the courts' use of the discretionary
approach indirectly lends legislative support to this judicial trend.
III. VARIETIES OF AVAILABLE CONSUMER RELIEF
Acknowledging the evolution of Truth-in-Lending judgments to-
ward decisions favoring creditors,97 this section assesses the relief
available to consumers. To consider a typical situation, consumers
often contract for home-improvement work. The parties to such a
contract may agree to monthly installment payments that cover the
in a particular case, as well as consideration of the legislative policy of full disclosure
... and the remedial-penal nature of the private enforcement provisions of the Act."
Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 862 (9th Cir. 1974).
93. The terms "discretionalist" approach and "literalist" approach were coined in
Note, Consumer Protection: Judicial 4pproaches to Rescission and Restoralion under
the Truth in Lending,4ct, 53 WASH. L. REv. 301 (1978).
94. Id at 312.
95. 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974) (action by plaintiff-borrowers against lenders for
failure to state the total of payments due and the amount financed, and failure to
inform of right to rescind).
96. In loan situations, courts applying a discretionist approach usually order de-
ferred restoration because of the debtor's inability to repay the amount borrowed.
"Deferred restoration can be accomplished by either conditioning termination upon
the borrower's compliance with a realistic repayment plan, or granting termination
unconditionally and entering judgment for the creditor in the amount of the loan
proceeds." Note, supra note 93, at 313.
97. See note 17 supra. Paer suggests that the economic difficulties recently exper-
ienced in the business sector prompted the courts to ease the creditors' burden. Pacr,
supra note 16, at 365.
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cost of the service and include finance charges. If the contract falls
short of Truth-in-Lending disclosure requirements,9" the debtor may
be entitled to some form of relief.
One possible resolution is an award of total conjunctive relief: re-
scission, statutory damages and attorney's fees.99 Under this scheme,
the amount of the note is rescinded and the debtor is entitled to the
return of all monies paid plus damages. The creditor invokes the
forfeiture rule"°° if he fails to act upon the debtor's notification of his
intention to rescind. The creditor is also liable for attorney's fees.' 0 '
Several courts, although relying on different rationales, have desig-
nated this as the proper remedy. In Sosa v. Fite,10 2 the court applied
the Act literally and stated that forcing a debtor to elect a remedy
would undercut the legislation's effectiveness. The Eby v. Reb Realty
98. See note 28 supra.
99. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1635, 1640 (1976).
100. Id. § 1635 (1976), 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(d) (1980). "Mhe Act flatly provides
that if his creditor continues in his untoward ways, the debtor incurs no obligation to
pay for property which he is at the same time entitled to keep." Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d
114, 119 (5th Cir. 1974). Where the rescinding plaintiffs borrowed from the defend-
ants, the loan's unpaid principal balance was considered "property" within the mean-
ing of the Act. Strader v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 551 P.2d 720 (Colo. 1976). For a
discussion of Strader, see Comment, Consequences of the Creditor's Failure to Ac-
knowledge Rescission by the Debtor under Strader v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 48 U. COLO.
L. REv. 437 (1977).
Strader was an action under Colorado's Uniform Consumer Credit Code. Often
there are discrepancies between the state-enacted uniform code and the federal act,
but the states are obligated not to adopt inconsistent rules. See; Miller, Living with
Both the UCCC and Regulation Z, 26 OKLA. L. REv. I (1973).
101. In the hypothetical situation, if the consumer agreed to a note of $5,000 for
the home improvement of which he paid $400, and the court awards the maximum
amount of damages under § 1640(aX1), then the judgment would produce the follow-
ing results:
Amount of Note $ 5000.00
Full Rescission -5000.00
Debtor Owes -0-
Return of Monies Paid 400.00
Damages +1000.00
1400.00
Attorney's Fees +750.00
Creditor Owes $ 2150.00
102. 498 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff only sought § 1635 rescission, but court
allowed recovery of attorney's fees).
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Co. 103 court also held that a literal interpretation dictated conjunc-
tive relief and rejected the argument that such an approach Would
produce inequitable consequences. It has also been noted that a lit-
eral interpretation promotes uniformity of results in TILA actions.'
Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit in Burley v. Bastrop Financial
Co. 105 employed judicial discretion and characterized the relief as
conditional. Burley involved a consumer transaction secured by a
mortgage on the debtor's primary residence. Defendant did not pro-
vide notice of the right of rescission. Plaintiff's attorney sent a letter
of rescission, but defendant did not respond. The Burley court or-
dered the creditor to return the plaintiff's down payment, directed
termination of the mortgage on the debtor's property and ordered
dismissal of defendant's state court action. The court indicated that
this was the appropriate remedy since the creditor failed to mitigate
its violations. These cases illustrate that under certain circumstances
the literalist and discretionist approaches may prescribe identical
remedies.
By balancing various elements, a court using its discretion can de-
vise a wide range of alternative remedies. Many courts find the lit-
eral approach's forfeiture theory 0 6 unacceptable. Thus, some
condition a contract's rescission upon the debtor's repayment of the
balance, while voiding the security interest. These courts conjunc-
tively award statutory damages and attorney's fees."°7 In Pedro v.
103. 495 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff, a purchaser of real property, sought
rescission and twice the amount of the finance charge under § 1640).
104. One commentator notes that a reason the legislature set out the sequence of
events in the statute was to achieve uniformity. The same author objects to using a
balancing approach to allow a creditor to avoid its obligation. Comment, supra note
100, at 445.
105. 407 F. Supp. 773 (W.D. La. 1975).
106. See note 100 supra.
107. See note 101 supra. Then assuming the same facts and adding a finance
charge of about $1,550.00, under this judicial approach the result would be:
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Pacec Plan of California,"I° the court recognized that Pacific Plan's
disclosure violations gave rise to statutory damages and cancellation
of the transactions. Plaintiff gave timely notice of exercising her right
of rescission and defendant offered to cancel the transaction upon
Pedro's payment of a limited sum. The court regarded defendant's
limited offer as forfeiting its right to restitution, but affirmed the bor-
rower's admission of an equitable obligation to restore the net bal-
ance she received."
Concern with the rescinding consumer's unjust enrichment also
contributed to the court's decision in Gerasta v. Hibernia National
Bank." ° The Gerasta court acknowledged that rescission does not
preclude section 1640 relief, but upheld the position that such relief is
dependent upon "a court's sense of equity"; therefore, the court may
deny the request when the facts don't merit section 1640 relief."'
Another possible solution in a loan transaction situation is a grant
of rescission based on repayment of the principal with the security
interest staying in effect."I2 The leading case endorsing this position
is Palmer v. Wilson."' The Palmer court expressed concern over the
Amount of Note $ 5000.00
"Rescission"
a. finance charge -1550.00
3450.00
b. return of monies -400.00
paid
3050.00
Damages -1000.00
Debtor Owes $ 2050.00
Attorney's Fees
Creditor Owes $ 750.00
108. 393 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (plaintiff brought action against broker for
failure to disclose identity of the lender).
109. "Since plaintiff does not contend that Pacific Plan has practiced any fraud or
unconscionable conduct, the Court concludes that plaintiff had an equitable duty to
restore the net amount she received." Id at 324.
110. 411 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. La. 1976).
111. Id at 192.
112. See notes 101 and 107 supra. The results are the same as in the second alter-
native as set forth in note 107 supra, but here rescission is predicated on repayment of
the principal with the security interest staying in effect.
113. 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Rachbach v. Cogswell, 547 F.2d 502
(10th Cir. 1976) (imposition of interest as condition to right of rescission); LaGrone v.
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creditor's ability to recover the amount advanced. The retention of
the security interest protects the creditor if the borrower is incapable
of restoration." 4 This approach is inconsistent with the Act's lan-
guage which stipulates that the creditor must remove any lien prior to
tender by the debtor." 15 The retention of the security interest on the
debtor's property seems contrary to the legislative purpose of protect-
ing homes. 1 6 The apparent harshness of conditional rescission on
consumers, however, is mitigated when the judgment lien is distin-
guished from the original security interest. State statutes usually pro-
vide certain exemption rights regarding the real property of a
judgment debtor. Thus, the creditor may reach less of the debtor's
property under a lien than under a security interest. The creditor
may also lose priority to other intervening creditors. 17
Johnson, 534 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1976) (damages precluded by statute of limitations);
Ljepava v. M.L.S.C. Properties, Inc., 511 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1975).
114. See note 96 supra.
The result is that the creditor, having been stripped of his security interest by
rescission, finds that the debtor is judgment-proof. The creditor may lose not
only the investment value of the loan but also the principal, in addition to the
administrative costs of the loan, a civil penalty, attorneys' fees and costs of the
truth in lending action.
Note, supra note 31, at 879 (1975). The Palmer court held that on remand the lower
court could require defendants to submit a proposed plan of repayment to accommo-
date defendants' desire for recovery that was consistent with the Palmers' financial
situation. 502 F.2d at 862-63.
115. Reg. Z § 226.9(d) in pertinent part reads:
Within 10 days after receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall return to
the customer any money or property given as earnest money, down-payment, or
otherwise, and shall take any action necessary or appropriate to reflect the termi-
nation of any security interest created under the transaction. If the creditor has
delivered any property to the customer, the customer may retain possession of it.
Upon the performance of the creditor's obligations under this section, the customer
shall tender the property to the creditor, except that if return of the property in
kind would be impracticable or inequitable, the customer shall tender its reason-
able value.
12 C.F.R. § 226.9(d) (1980). (Emphasis added.)
116. See note 34supra. "Under the Act a court should be concerned that defend-
ants ultimately receive the money they advance under a loan agreement, but it must
be careful that such concern does not provide lenders with a method of frustrating the
main purpose of the Act, which is to allow rescission." Ljepava v. M.L.S.C. Proper-
ties, Inc. 511 F.2d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 1975). See Case Note, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 211,
221.
117. These state statutes grant homestead exemptions and can reduce the credi-
tor's status from a holder of a security interest in property to a judgment creditor and
thus protect the debtor. See Note, Truth in Lending-Right of Rescission, 1975 Wis.
L. REv. 192, 198-99.
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A more severe determination from a debtor's viewpoint would be
the award of damages and attorney's fees without rescission. Thus,
the consumer would owe the balance of the note, including the
finance charge, reduced by the amount of damages awarded. The
creditor would still be liable for attorney's fees." 8 In Powers v. Sims
and Levin,' 9 plaintiffs attempted to rescind and offered to deliver the
transaction's partial value. The court found anticipatory breach by
the debtor and held there is no condition precedent to clear title when
it is evident that the borrower does not intend to repay. 120 Thus, un-
der Powers, debtors must give an unqualified notice of exercise of the
rescission right.
In Regulation Z, the Federal Reserve Board accounted for another
potentially inequitable situation by enacting the section 226.9(c) de-
lay of performance provision. That provision forbids certain acts' 2'
by a creditor before "the rescission period has expired and he has
reasonably satisfied himself that the customer has not exercised his
right of rescission."'122 Since there should be no performance in the
three-day rescission period after the transaction's consummation, the
debtor will not receive any unjust benefits. The only time the con-
sumer can rescind after the creditor has performed some service is
118. See notes 101, 107 and 112 supra. Under the Powers scheme the results
would be:
Amount of Note $ 5000.00
Monies paid - 400.00
4600.00
Damages -1000.00
Debtor Owes $ 3600.00
Attorney's Fees
Creditor Owes $ 750.00
119. 542 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1976). At the time of the home improvement transac-
tion with Sims and Levin, Powers owed the First & Merchants Bank $2,758.13, which
was secured by a first mortgage. Defendant satisfied plaintif's debt and that mort-
gage was canceled.
120. The court found that rescission absolves the borrower of the obligation to
pay finance or other charges, but does not relieve him of the duty to restore. Id at
1220-22.
121. The creditor is prohibited from disbursing any money other than in escrow;
making any physical changes in the customer's property; performing any work or
service or making any deliveries to the customer's residence if the security interest is
other than one arising by operation of law. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c) (1980).
122. Id
19801
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
upon the creditor's nondisclosure. 123
IV. CONCLUSION
It is crucial to keep in mind the TILA's purpose of compelling
creditor disclosures to facilitate consumer comparison between avail-
able sources and to encourage competition among lenders. 124
Through the Truth-in-Lending Act, Congress also hoped to promote
private litigation by consumers. In light of these objectives, the re-
scission and civil liability sections should be construed as penal as
well as remedial provisions. Courts should therefore award conjunc-
tive relief.
Influenced by the possibility of inequitable results, some courts re-
sort to a balancing approach. In many cases, however, creditors
could avoid imposition of harsh penalties by compliance with the dis-
closure requirements. Creditor contentions that TILA's requirements
are difficult to implement may well be valid, but these ambiguities
should be remedied through Congressional amendment 125 or by ex-
planatory regulations promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board.
Congress sought to clarify the parties' obligations in consumer
credit transactions by enacting the Truth-in-Lending legislation. Yet,
the increased use of judicial discretion creates uncertainty for both
creditors and debtors. An approach that appears consistent with
Congressional intent and equitable to all parties is the incorporation
of the debtor's obligation 126 into the court's judgment. A court
achieves mutual restoration by ordering rescission, voiding the secur-
123. To distinguish the two three-day periods when rescission is permissible, see
note 44 supra.
124. The Act's effectiveness in achieving its goals has been frequently questioned.
See Landers & Rohner, A Functional Analysis of Truth in Lending, 26 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 711 (1979). Landers and Rohner contend that consumer behavior is not affected
by disclosure statements, regardless of the quality of the statement. Id at 715. They
cite several reasons supporting their conclusion, amongst them that disclosures are
made after a preliminary agreement has been reached and the consumer is "verbally
and psychologically committed." Id at 715-16. Also, most credit sales occur when
the consumer needs the good or service on credit terms and thus must seek "the best
terms offered by a creditor who will approve his credit." Id at 716. Landers and
Rohner state that shopping for credit terms after disclosure is not cost effective. Id at
717-18.
125. Congress is considering simplifying and reforming the Act, as evidenced by
S. 108. See note 18 supra. The proposed amendments, if approved, will directly af-
fect and clarify issues now being litigated.
126. This is similar to the second alternative discussed. See note 107 supra.
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ity interest and giving the creditor the principal balance due him. By
comparison, the conditional rescission approach'27 threatens the
debtor with the loss of his home. Incorporation of the debtor's obli-
gation encourages consumer suits that may help compel creditor
compliance and yet dissuade frivolous or malicious legal actions.
127. See note 112 snpra.
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